



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Advisory Circular

DRAFT

Subject: AIRWORTHINESS APPROVAL OF
TRAFFIC ALERT AND COLLISION
AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS (TCAS II) AND MODE S
TRANSPONDERS

Date: AC No: 20-131B
Initiated by: AIR-130 **Change:**

1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) provides guidance material for the airworthiness approval of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS II) certified to Technical Standard Order (TSO)-C119b and Mode S transponders. Like all AC material, this AC is not mandatory and does not constitute a regulation. It is issued for guidance purposes and to outline a method of compliance with the rules. In lieu of following this method without deviation, the applicant may elect to follow an alternative method, provided the alternative method is also found by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to be an acceptable means of complying with the requirements of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). Because the method of compliance presented in this AC is not mandatory, the terms “shall” and “must” used herein apply only to an applicant who chooses to follow this particular method without deviation.

2. CANCELLATION. AC 20-131A, Airworthiness Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS II) and Mode S Transponders, dated March 29, 1993, is NOT canceled. It may be used for a TCAS II certified to an earlier version of TSO-C119.

3. RELATED SECTIONS OF 14 CFR.

a. Related Federal Aviation Regulations. Portions of 14 CFR, as presently written, can be applied for the design, substantiation, certification and operational approval of TCAS II and Mode S transponders. Sections which prescribe requirements for these types of systems include:

- (1) Section 25.301 Loads.
- (2) Section 25.303 Factor of safety.
- (3) Section 25.305 Strength and deformation.

- (4) Section 25.561 Emergency Landing Conditions - General.
- (5) Section 25.603 Materials.
- (6) Section 25.609 Protection of structure.
- (7) Section 25.629 Flutter, deformation, and fail-safe criteria.
- (8) Section 25.869 Fire protection: systems
- (9) Section 25.1301 Function and installation.
- (10) Section 25.1303 Flight and navigation instruments.
- (11) Section 25.1307 Miscellaneous equipment.
- (12) Section 25.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations.
- (13) Section 25.1321 Arrangement and visibility.
- (14) Section 25.1322 Warning, caution, and advisory lights.
- (15) Section 25.1331 Instruments using a power supply.
- (16) Section 25.1333 Instrument systems.
- (17) Section 25.1335 Flight director systems.
- (18) Section 25.1351 Electrical Systems and Equipment: General.
- (19) Section 25.1353 Electrical equipment and installations.
- (20) Section 25.1355 Distribution system.
- (21) Section 25.1357 Circuit protective devices.
- (22) Section 25.1381 Instrument lights.
- (23) Section 25.1431 Electronic equipment.
- (24) Section 25.1541 Markings and Placards: General.
- (25) Section 25.1581 Airplane Flight Manual: General.
- (26) Section 25.1585 Operating procedures

NOTE: The references to 14 CFR part 25 are appropriate for use when TCAS is to be installed on transport airplanes. When TCAS is to be certified for use in non-transport airplanes, the equivalent sections to the above 14 CFR part 25 Sections in other parts of the Regulations shall be used.

b. Advisory Circulars.

(1) AC 20-115B, Radio Technical Commission on Aeronautics (RTCA) document DO178B.

(2) AC 25.1309-1A, System Design and Analysis.

(3) AC 25-11, Transport Category Airplane Electronic Display Systems.

(4) AC 20-XX, Procedures and Criteria for Determining the Type Rating Requirements for an Aircraft.

(5) AC 120-55B, Air Carrier Operational Approval and Use of TCAS II.

c. Technical Standard Orders.

(1) TSO-C112 Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select (ATCRBS/Mode S) Airborne Equipment.

(2) TSO-C119b Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne Equipment, TCAS II.

d. Industry Documents.

(1) RTCA documents. These documents can be obtained from the RTCA, 1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1010, Washington, D.C. 20005.

(a) DO-160D, Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment.

(b) DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certifications.

(c) DO-181A, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System/Mode Select (ATCRBS/Mode S) Airborne Equipment.

(d) DO-185A, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) Airborne Equipment.

(2) Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) Documents. These documents are available from the Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc. (SAE), 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096.

(a) ARP 926A, Fault/Failure Analysis Procedure.

(b) ARP 1834, Fault/Failure Analysis Guidelines for Digital Equipment.

(c) ARP 1068A, Flight Deck Instrumentation, Display Criteria and Associated Controls for Transport Aircraft.

(d) ARP 4754. Certification Considerations for Highly Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems

(e) ARP 4761. Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment

4. DEFINITIONS. The following definitions are applicable to this AC.

a. Advisory. A message given to alert the crew of converging aircraft and/or a potential collision.

b. Air Traffic Control (ATC). A generic term for a joint civil/military system for controlling traffic within a specific area.

c. Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS). A secondary surveillance radar system having ground based interrogators and airborne transponders capable of operation on Modes A and C.

d. Alert. Indication (aural or visual) which provides information to the flight crew in a timely manner about a converging aircraft or a potential collision.

e. Coast. Condition which occurs when TCAS II does not receive a reply to an interrogation from an intruder for which it has established a track, resulting in the logic continuing the track based on previous track characteristics.

f. Corrective Resolution Advisory (RA). A resolution advisory that advises the pilot to either deviate from current vertical speed, such as, CLIMB when the aircraft is level, or to maintain an existing climb or descent rate.

g. Discrete. A separate, complete and distinct signal.

h. Failure. The inability of a system, subsystem, unit, or part to perform within previously specified limits.

- i. False advisory. An advisory caused by a false track or a TCAS malfunction.
- j. Fruit. Intruder replies corrupted by the receipt of undesired transponder replies that were elicited by ground interrogators and other TCAS II interrogators.
- k. Incorrect Resolution Advisory(RA). An RA which occurs when a threat is present, but, because of a failure of the installed TCAS II, Mode S transponder, or associated sensors, commands a maneuver which reduces separation to the threat.
- l. Intruder. Aircraft, which has satisfied the TCAS traffic advisory detection criteria.
- m. Mode A. Type of secondary surveillance radar (SSR) equipment or mode of operation which provides a selected 4096 code reply (nonaltitude) when interrogated.
- n. Mode C. Type of secondary surveillance radar (SSR) equipment or mode of operation which provides a reply with aircraft altitude information when interrogated.
- o. Mode S. Type of secondary surveillance radar (SSR) equipment which provides replies to Mode A and Mode C ground interrogations, a discrete address, and other aircraft information in response to interrogations from the ground or air.
- p. Other traffic. Aircraft more than ± 1200 feet vertical and 6 NM from own aircraft which are neither an RA nor a TA.
- q. Preventive Resolution Advisory. An RA that requires a pilot to avoid certain deviations from current vertical rate (for example, a Do Not Climb RA when the aircraft is level).
- r. Proximate traffic. An aircraft which is within 6 NM in range and within $\pm 1,200$ feet vertically, from own aircraft but does not meet the TCAS thresholds of a TA or RA .
- s. Resolution advisory (RA). Aural voice and display information provided by TCAS to a flight crew, advising that a particular maneuver should, or should not, be performed to attain or maintain minimum safe vertical separation from an intruder .
- t. Resolution display. A display which shows vertical guidance depicting areas to “fly to” and/or avoid above or below the TCAS equipped aircraft.
- u. Sense. A direction that a RA may take (either UP or DOWN) relative to the existing flight path of own aircraft.
- v. Threat. An intruder that has satisfied the threat detection logic and thus requires an RA.

w. Traffic. Aircraft with an operating transponder capable of being tracked and displayed by a TCAS equipped aircraft.

x. Traffic advisory (TA). Aural voice and display information provided by TCAS to a flight crew, identifying the location of nearby traffic meeting certain minimum separation criteria.

y. Traffic display. A display of the horizontal position of transponder equipped aircraft relative to the TCAS equipped aircraft.

5. SCOPE. The material provided in this advisory circular addresses the design aspects, characteristics, mechanization, testing, and the criticality of system failure cases for TCAS II and Mode S transponders. The guidance material is directed at systems which provide TA's and RA's in the vertical axis only (TCAS II) and where the operational performance standards are defined in technical documents that were developed by a joint air transport industry-government group (RTCA Special Committee SC-147).

6. BACKGROUND. The airline industry has been working through the Air Transport Association since 1955 to find a workable collision avoidance system. It was not until the mid 1970s, however, that research centered upon the use of signals from ATCRBS airborne transponders as the cooperative element of a collision avoidance system. This technical approach allows a collision avoidance capability on the flight deck, which is independent of the ground system. In 1981, the FAA announced its decision to proceed with the implementation of an aircraft collision avoidance concept called the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). The concept is based upon agency and industry development efforts in the areas of beacon based collision avoidance systems and air-to-air discrete address communications techniques utilizing Mode S airborne transponder message formats.

a. A short time later, prototypes of TCAS II were installed on two Piedmont Airlines B-727 aircraft, and were flown on regularly scheduled flights. Although the displays were located outside the view of the flight crew and were seen only by trained observers, these tests did provide valuable information on the frequency and circumstances of alerts and their potential for interaction with the ATC system. On a follow-on phase II program, a later version of TCAS II was installed on a single Piedmont Airlines B-727, and the system was certified in April 1986 and subsequently approved for operational evaluation in early 1987. Since the equipment was not developed to full standards, the system was only operated in visual meteorological conditions. Although the flight crew operated the system, the evaluation was primarily for the purpose of data collection and its correlation with flight crew and observer observation and response.

b. Later versions of TCAS II manufactured by Bendix/King Air Transport Avionics Division were installed and approved on United Airlines airplanes in early 1988. Similar units manufactured by Honeywell were installed and approved on Northwest Airlines airplanes in late 1988. This Limited Installation Program operated TCAS II units approved for operation as a full-time system in both visual and instrument meteorological

conditions on three different aircraft types. The operational evaluation programs continued through 1988 to validate the operational suitability of the systems.

7. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION. TCAS II is an airborne traffic alert and collision avoidance system that interrogates ATC transponders in nearby aircraft and uses computer processing to identify and display potential and predicted collision threats. The system is designed to protect a volume of airspace around the TCAS II equipped aircraft. The system will provide appropriate aural and visual advisories to the flight crew, to take action so as to ensure adequate separation, when the computer analysis of the intruding aircraft transponder replies predict a penetration of the protected airspace. The system provides two types of advisories. Technical advisories (TA's) indicate the relative positions of intruding aircraft that are approximately 40 seconds from the closest point of approach and may a short time later require a resolution advisory. They also provide the flight crew the opportunity to visually acquire the intruding aircraft. A resolution advisory (RA) will provide a vertical avoidance maneuver that will increase separation when the computer predicts the threat aircraft is within approximately 25 seconds from the closest point of approach.

a. The system provides two types of flight deck displays. A traffic display indicates the relative position of ATC transponder equipped aircraft. A resolution display for each pilot indicates the appropriate vertical maneuver to avoid a threat. The TCAS II aircraft must be equipped with a Mode S ATC transponder which provides air-to-air communications for coordinating the resolution maneuvers between TCAS equipped aircraft. The Mode S transponder also provides discrete address replies to interrogations from ground stations and other TCAS II equipped aircraft.

b. The TCAS II system can only generate resolution advisories for intruders equipped with responding Mode S or Mode C transponders, which provide information on the altitude of the threat aircraft. Traffic advisories can be generated for any aircraft equipped with an operative Mode S or ATRBS transponder, regardless of its ability to provide information on the intruder aircraft's altitude. The TCAS II equipment is viewed as a supplement to the pilot who has the primary responsibility for avoiding midair collisions. The TCAS II system provides no indication of aircraft without operative transponders.

8. AIRWORTHINESS CONSIDERATIONS.

a. Certification Program. This advisory circular provides guidance for the installation of TCAS II equipment and Mode S transponders. The system displays information and provides advisories in a number of formats. The degree of system integration to perform these functions is extensive and as a result, the applicant's program must be directed toward airworthiness approval through the type certification or supplemental type certification process.

b. Certification Plan. A comprehensive certification plan should be developed by the applicant. It should include how the applicant plans to comply with the applicable

certification requirements and should provide a listing of the substantiating data and necessary tests. Also, a system description and an estimated time schedule should be included. A well developed plan will be of significant value both to the applicant and the FAA.

c. Equipment Installation.

(1) Mode S Transponder. A Mode S transponder is required for TCAS II operation. It is an enhanced version of existing ATCRBS transponders that is interoperable and compatible with the current ATCRBS system. Each aircraft equipped with a Mode S transponder is assigned a discrete address code. Mode S also provides the air-to-air data link between TCAS II equipped aircraft to coordinate resolution maneuvers. This ensures that the resolution advisory displayed in one TCAS II equipped aircraft is compatible with the maneuver displayed in the other TCAS II equipped aircraft. It has the capability to provide a data link between the equipped aircraft and the ground, and performs all the functions of current ATCRBS transponders. A Mode S transponder may be installed independently or in conjunction with a TCAS II installation. The performance standard for Mode S is provided in paragraph (a)(1), Minimum Performance Standard, of TSO-C112. The discrete aircraft address for the Mode S transponder must be obtained from the appropriate airworthiness authorities of the country in which the aircraft is registered for each aircraft in which a Mode S transponder is installed. For U.S. registered aircraft the discrete aircraft address may be obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration, Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, Aircraft Registration Information, AVN-450, PO Box 25082, Oklahoma City, OK 73125, Telephone: (405) 680-3116.

(2) Pilot Control.

(a) A means to select the following modes of operation must be provided:

1 Operation of the Mode S transponder only.

2 Operation of the TCAS II in the TA/RA mode and Mode S transponder simultaneously.

3 Operation of the ATCRBS transponder only, if installed. It must not be possible to operate the TCAS II and ATCRBS transponder or the Mode S and ATCRBS transponder simultaneously.

4 Operation of TCAS II in the TA mode and Mode S transponder simultaneously.

5 Operation of TCAS II in the standby mode.

(b) The following additional features must also be provided:

1 A means to select the assigned ATCRBS code.

2 A means to initiate the transponder “IDENT” function.

3 A means to initiate the TCAS II self-test.

4 A means to suppress transponder altitude reporting.

(c) The following optional controls may be provided:

1 Selection of the weather radar only.

2 Control to select the display of traffic within selected altitude bands.

3 Selection of the weather radar and traffic display simultaneously.

4 Selection of actual flight level (FL) or relative altitude of traffic.

5 Selection of TCAS traffic information on multi-function displays.

(3) Antennas. The Mode S transponder shall have a top and bottom omnidirectional antenna. The TCAS II shall have a top directional antenna and a bottom omnidirectional or directional antenna.

(a) Directional antennas. For an aircraft installation, the TCAS II directional antenna should be located on the top, forward fuselage as close to the centerline as possible. If more than one directional antenna is provided, locate the second antenna in a similar manner on the lower fuselage. The TCAS II antennas should be mounted on the aircraft with at least 20 dB isolation from other L band frequency antennas. Since the antenna diameter may be large, some structural considerations may be necessary and a centerline offset resulting in an angular offset of up to 5 degrees is acceptable. The maximum height of the directional antenna is expected to be approximately 1 inch, and therefore is not considered susceptible to icing effects in the general area of the proposed installation. Otherwise, anti-icing provisions should be considered. Section 3 of Volume I of RTCA document DO-185A provides antenna selection and performance criteria. For propeller driven aircraft, the location and performance of the directional antenna must be investigated for minimum blockage and to ensure that the propellers do not interfere with system operation.

(b) Omnidirectional antennas. The TCAS II antennas should be mounted on the bottom of the aircraft fuselage as close to the centerline as possible with at least 20 dB isolation from other L band frequency antennas. The Mode S transponder antennas shall be mounted at locations chosen for adequate isolation and signal coverage. These antennas may be standard ATCRBS transponder antennas.

(c) Structural analysis. A structural analysis of the antenna installations showing compliance with the applicable regulations of 14 CFR should be submitted to the FAA.

(4) The TCAS II Processor. The TCAS II processor unit uses transponder reply information and information from the own aircraft to identify and to display potential and predicted collision threats, and to issue resolution advisories to avoid the threat aircraft. The TCAS II processor unit must comply with the environmental requirements and minimum performance standards specified in TSO-C119b. A manufacturer of TSO equipment may obtain authorization to produce equipment which deviates from the detailed criteria of the TSO. The FAA aircraft certification office which is approving the initial installation of the TCAS II equipment must verify that the TCAS II processor design does not differ from the criteria specified in RTCA document DO-185A, Volumes I and II, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne Equipment.

(5) Equipment Compatibility. An evaluation should be made to show that the TCAS II system will communicate with other approved TCAS II systems made by other manufacturers. This evaluation should include a TCAS II to TCAS II coordination demonstration, or equivalent, with at least one other manufacturer's approved TCAS II system. If it can be shown for a specific design that communication link failures are no more hazardous than encountering a Mode C intruder, then these tests are not necessary. Also, after completing mature bench tests, future certification experience may show that these tests are no longer necessary.

(6) Aircraft Performance.

(a) This paragraph, along with table 1, provides guidance on considerations and analysis to evaluate the need to inhibit TCAS II CLIMB and/or INCREASE CLIMB RA's because of inadequate aircraft climb performance. The collision avoidance maneuvers posted as RA's by TCAS II assume an aircraft's ability to safely achieve them. If it is likely the required response to CLIMB and INCREASE CLIMB RA's are beyond the performance capability of the aircraft, then TCAS II must know beforehand so it can change its strategy and issue an alternative RA. These performance limits shall be provided to TCAS II from the aircraft interface and discretized relative to altitude and/or configuration. However, the need to inhibit TCAS II CLIMB or INCREASE CLIMB RA's should be carefully considered since the alternative RA's may not provide the optimum solution to the encounter. Inhibiting these RA's will increase the likelihood of TCAS II (a) issuing crossing maneuvers (crossing through an intruder's altitude), thus increasing the probability that an RA may be thwarted by the intruder maneuvering, (b) causing an increase in DESCEND RA's at low altitude, and (c) providing no RA's if below the descend inhibit altitude of 1200 feet AGL during takeoff and 1000 feet AGL on approach.

(b) The configuration interface may need switches or sensors ,besides the basic airplane flap position switches, to prevent unnecessary TCAS II inhibits. For example, if CLIMB RA's need to be inhibited for the maximum takeoff flap only, and no switch exists to sense that position, an additional switch should be installed in lieu of simply using one that may exist at lesser flap angles.

(c) Because TCAS II can only accept a limited number of inputs related to airplane performance, it is not possible to automatically inhibit Climb and Increase Climb RA's in all cases where it may be appropriate to inhibit such RA's. In these cases, TCAS II may command maneuvers which may significantly reduce stall margins or result in stall warning. Conditions where this may occur include bank angles greater than 15 degrees, weight/altitude/temperature combinations outside the envelope shown in table 1, initial speeds below those shown in table 1, one engine inoperative, leaving configuration fixed for climb RA's on landing transition to go-around, and abnormal configurations such as landing gear not retractable. The Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) or Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS) should provide information concerning this aspect of TCAS so that flight crews may take appropriate action.

(d) An aircraft's low altitude climb capability during takeoff, approach, or landing is significantly affected by the aircraft's configuration, initial climb true airspeed available to safely trade if needed for climb rate, and the initial airspeed margin from the current stall speed. Table 1, Conditions 1-3 apply for the takeoff and initial climb configuration analysis. Conditions 4-6 apply for the approach flap configuration analysis when operating in the terminal area with the flaps set at less than the landing flaps. Conditions 7-9 apply for the landing flight regime analysis. To be consistent with normal operation, the AFM or AFMS should indicate that when a climb RA occurs with the aircraft in the landing configuration, the pilot should initiate the normal go-around procedure when complying with the TCAS II RA. Therefore, it may be assumed that the flaps are being retracted from the landing position to the go-around position when evaluating Conditions 7-9.

(e) To prevent very unlikely combinations of events, such as weight/altitude/temperature limiting conditions, in conjunction with low airspeed, high drag configurations, unusual encounter geometries, etc., causing climb inhibits when generally the aircraft's performance is more than adequate, the entry and exit conditions and RA's in table 1 are structured into two classes of encounters. Maneuvers A and B represent reasonably severe combinations of entry conditions and RA's, and restricts the exit conditions to $1.2 V_{s1}$. Maneuver C represents reasonably worst case combinations of entry conditions and RA's, and for this very unlikely event may require flying near stall warning conditions through the recovery. Airspeeds between $1.2 V_{s1}$ and stall warning represent a range of usable airspeed that may be traded for climb performance (as is currently recommended for windshear recovery) for evaluation of this low probability event. The altitude/temperature envelope represents a range of values which exist at busy airports in the continental USA. Operation routinely outside this envelope may require special crew procedures if the normal AFM weight, altitude, temperature, and configuration limitations are not sufficiently compensating, such as operation at Mexico City.

(f) For those airplanes that may routinely operate at low climb airspeeds during the clean configuration, enroute phase of flight, such as propeller commuter airplanes, consideration should be given to providing a discrete to the TCAS II based on airspeed. Such an input, derived from a TCAS II interface system, would provide for CLIMB or INCREASE CLIMB RA inhibits when the airplane is in the clean configuration and operating below a certain airspeed. Such a scheme would be considered appropriate in lieu of an across-the-board inhibit for the clean configuration regardless of flight regime, which is not considered to provide the best overall level of safety as previously discussed.

(g) An aircraft's climb capability when operating at or near its maximum approved operating altitude is also affected by excess thrust and true airspeed, which may be available to safely trade for climb rate. Climb RA's should not be inhibited if the aircraft has adequate performance available or because it may exceed its maximum certificated altitude by several hundred feet during an RA. The configurations that should be evaluated in this flight regime are shown in table 1, Conditions 10 and 11. If the aircraft is approved for significant alternative configurations, then the initial airspeed used for the analysis should be appropriate for them; such as spare engine pod, gear down operation, etc. In the analysis of the aircraft's ability to accelerate and return to the initial speed and altitude following the RA, an undershoot of approximately 200 feet is permissible.

(h) In icing conditions, the 14 CFR limited performance weights must be reduced, and sometimes the operating speeds increased, to account for icing system bleeds and residual ice on the unprotected surfaces. Therefore, the capability to perform the TCAS II maneuvers remains essentially unchanged, eliminating the need to provide additional RA inhibits under these circumstances. However, if a particular aircraft design shows marginal capability to operate in the icing environment, additional RA inhibits enabled by icing system activation should be considered.

(i) If Maneuver A causes airspeeds below the minimum in Table 1, then the CLIMB RA should be inhibited. If Maneuver B or C cause airspeeds below the minimum in table 1, then the INCREASED CLIMB RA should be inhibited. However, early recovery of 1 to 2 seconds is of little or no consequence on the collision avoidance maneuver and a higher overall level of safety will be achieved if inhibits are not provided under these circumstances, as previously discussed in paragraph 3c(6)(i).

(j) A summary of the system inhibits (limitations) that have been programmed into the TCAS computer are given in table 2.

Table 1

C O N D	FLIGHT REGIME	WEIGHT, ALTITUDE, TEMPERATURE ¹	THRUST	FLAPS	GEAR	AIRSPEED		M A N E U V
						INITIAL	MINIMUM	
1	Takeoff	Part 25 Climb Limit	Maximum Rated Takeoff	All Takeoff	Up	V_2+20^2	$1.2V_{s1}^4$ thru RA	A
2	Takeoff	Part 25 Climb Limit	Maximum Rated Takeoff	All Takeoff	Up	V_2+20^2	$1.2V_{s1}^4$ thru RA	B
3	Takeoff	Part 25 Climb Limit	Maximum Rated Takeoff	All Takeoff	Up	AFM All-Engine Takeoff Speed ³	15° Bank to Stall Warning ⁵ thru Recovery	C
4	Approach	Part 25 Climb Limit	Spin up to Max Go-Around Thrust during Maneuver from thrust for level flight	Less than Landing	Up	$1.6V_{s1}$	$1.2V_{s1}^4$ thru RA	A
5	Approach	Part 25 Climb Limit	Spin up to Max Go-Around Thrust during Maneuver from thrust for level flight	Less than Landing	Up	$1.6V_{s1}$	$1.2V_{s1}^4$ thru RA	B
6	Approach	Part 25 Climb Limit	Spin up to Max Go-Around Thrust during Maneuver from thrust for level flight	Less than Landing	Up or Down to Up	Min. Maneuver Speed from Training Procedures	15° Bank to Stall Warning ⁵ thru Recovery	C
7	Landing, Transition to Go-Around at RA	Part 25 Climb Limit	Spin up to Max Go-Around Thrust during Maneuver from thrust required for 3° glideslope	Transition from Landing Flap to Go-Around Flap	Down to Up	$V_{REF}+10$	$1.2V_{s1}^4$ thru RA	A
8	Landing, Transition to Go-Around at RA	Part 25 Climb Limit	Spin up to Max Go-Around Thrust during Maneuver from thrust required for 3° glideslope	Transition from Landing Flap to Go-Around Flap	Down to Up	$V_{REF}+10$	$1.2V_{s1}^4$ thru RA	B
9	Landing, Transition to Go-Around at RA	Part 25 Climb Limit	Spin up to Max Go-Around Thrust during Maneuver from thrust required for 3° glideslope	Transition from Landing Flap to Go-Around Flap	Down to Up	V_{REF} +Airspeed Addition from Training Procedures	15° Bank to Stall Warning ⁵ thru Recovery	C
10	En Route	Critical Wt/Alt giving 0.3g to Buffet Onset	Thrust for level flight increased to Max. Continuous, if required	Up	Up	Long-Range Cruise	Higher of $1.2V_s^4$ if defined or buffet onset	A
11	En Route	Critical Wt/Alt giving 0.3g to Buffet Onset	Thrust for level flight increased to Max. Continuous, if required	Up	Up	Long-Range Cruise	Higher of $1.2V_s^4$ if defined or buffet onset	B

TABLE 1 NOTES:

1. Weight = Lesser of climb limit or structural; Airport Pressure Altitude = S.L. to 5300 ft; Temperature = ISA \pm 50 °F (10 °C); Conditions 1 - 3 evaluated 700 ft above airport; Conditions 4 - 9 evaluated 1700 ft above airport.
2. $V_y + 10$ for nontransport category aircraft without a defined V_2 .
3. V_y for nontransport category aircraft without a defined V_2 .
4. $1.1 V_s$ for those airplanes where the power-on stalling speed is significantly reduced from the power-off stalling speed.
5. V_{s1} for those airplanes where the power-on stalling speed is significantly reduced from the power-off stalling speed.

Table 1 – Maneuvers

A. This maneuver is to evaluate the TCAS II CLIMB RA. From the initial steady-state condition, after an expected 3-second pilot reaction time delay, rotate the aircraft at 1.25 g to attain +1500 feet per minute climb. Hold until the total duration of the RA of 25 seconds has elapsed. Recover to attain the initial trim airspeed.

B. This maneuver is to evaluate the TCAS II INCREASE CLIMB RA following a CLIMB RA. From the initial steady-state condition, after an expected 3-second pilot reaction time delay, rotate the aircraft at 1.25 g to attain +1500 feet per minute climb. Hold until 15 seconds has elapsed from when the CLIMB RA was issued. Then, after an expected 1-second pilot reaction time delay to the INCREASE CLIMB RA, rotate the aircraft again at 1.25 g to attain +2500 feet per minute climb and hold until the total duration of the RA of 25 seconds has elapsed. Recover to attain the initial trim airspeed.

C. This maneuver is to evaluate a maximum duration TCAS II INCREASE CLIMB RA following a minimum duration CLIMB RA. From the initial steady-state condition, after an expected 3-second pilot reaction time delay, rotate the aircraft at 1.25 g targeting +1500 feet per minute climb until 6 seconds has elapsed from when the CLIMB RA was issued. Then, after an expected 1-second pilot reaction time delay to the INCREASE CLIMB RA, rotate the aircraft again at 1.25 g to attain +2500 feet per minute climb and hold until the total duration of the RA of 24 seconds has elapsed. Delay recovery 1 second to account for expected pilot reaction time delay to the end of the encounter. Recover to attain the initial trim airspeed

Table 2 contains a summary of the inhibits (limitations) that have been programmed into the TCAS computer.

Table 2 – Systems Inhibits

INHIBIT	PARAMETERS
Increase Descent RA	Inhibited below 1450 ft AGL
Descend RA	Inhibited below 1200 ft AGL while climbing and inhibited below 1000 ft AGL while descending.
TA Voice Messages	Inhibited below 400 ft AGL while descending and inhibited below 600 ft AGL while climbing.
RA's	Inhibited below 900 ft AGL while descending and inhibited below 1100 ft AGL while climbing. (TCAS automatically reverts to TA only).
Self-Test	Can be inhibited when airborne.
Advisory Priority	Automatically reverts to TA ONLY when higher priority advisories (such as GPWS/TAWS and Windshear) occur.
Climb RA	Can be inhibited, based upon aircraft performance capability.
Increase Climb RA	Can be inhibited, based upon aircraft performance capability.

(7) Aircraft Interfaces.

(a) Pressure altitude information. The pressure altitude data shall be obtained from the most accurate source available in the aircraft and shall correspond to that being transmitted by the associated Mode S transponder. The accuracy of the altitude data shall be at least that specified in Paragraph 3.2.8 of RTCA document DO-185A. It shall be shown that the resolution of the altimetry source is compatible with TCAS II. The altitude source with the finest compatible resolution shall be used. When available, the resolution should be in increments of 10 feet or less. Information should also be provided to indicate when the pressure altitude information is invalid.

(b) Radio altitude information. Radio altitude information shall be provided to TCAS II to inhibit DESCEND resolution advisories below 1000 feet AGL, INCREASE DESCENT resolution advisories below 1450 feet AGL, all resolution advisories below 900 feet AGL, all aural traffic advisories below 400 feet AGL, to allow automatic sensitivity level selection when close to the ground, and to determine that individual targets are on the ground. Information shall also be provided to indicate when the radio altitude information is invalid.

(c) Aircraft configuration. Discrete information from aircraft configuration sensors such as flaps, slat, landing gear, etc., should be used to ensure that TCAS II

appropriately inhibits CLIMB and INCREASE CLIMB RA's to the airplane performance limits as described in paragraph 7c(6).

(d) Aircraft identification. Discrete information shall be provided to the Mode S transponder for the unique aircraft Mode S identification code and its maximum airspeed capability.

(e) Attitude. Information of pitch and roll attitude may be provided to assist with stabilization of the directional antenna function to assure surveillance and TA display data remain unaffected by aircraft normal maneuvers. If attitude information is used by TCAS II, the information shall also be provided to indicate when the attitude data are invalid.

(f) Heading. Information of aircraft heading may be provided for the TA display reference presentation. Information shall also be provided to indicate when the heading data are invalid.

(g) System failure display. An indication shall be provided to indicate when resolution advisories are not possible due to failure of the TCAS II equipment or any of its sensors or displays.

(h) Altitude Alerter Data. Information of the current clearance altitude may be provided from the altitude alerter to enable TCAS to select RAs that are more consistent with the aircraft's altitude clearance once the immediate collision threat has been resolved.

(i) Mode S Transponder Gillham altitude input requirements. The Gillham format uses 11 discrete wires that, depending on which wires are turned off or on represent an altitude value. The Gillham format is sometimes referred to as a blind encoder as error detection and/or correction on the wires is not conducted. For this reason, ARINC 718 states: "Pins have been reserved to permit the direct application of Gillham code data to the transponder. This practice is not encouraged because of concerns that a "stuck bit" in the coded input could be the cause of serious errors in TCAS resolution advisories." This is a failure mode peculiar to the Gillham code against which protection is virtually impossible. If Gillham coded altitude use cannot be avoided for the TCAS II installations, two sources must be connected to the transponder and their values compared. All transponder altitude comparator failures must be annunciated.

8) Traffic Display.

(a) Purpose. The primary purpose of the traffic display is to aid the flight crew in the visual acquisition of transponder equipped aircraft. This is accomplished by displaying the intruder aircraft's horizontal and, if altitude information is available, vertical position relative to the TCAS II equipped aircraft. The TCAS II systems will provide traffic information on Mode A (no altitude data available), Mode C, and Mode S

transponder equipped aircraft. A secondary purpose of the traffic display is to provide the flight crew with confidence in proper system operation and to give them time to prepare to maneuver the aircraft in the event TCAS II issues a resolution advisory.

(b) Description. The traffic display may take several forms. Traffic displays may be independent, stand alone, integrated and time shared with digital color radar, integrated with the flight crew's Instantaneous Vertical Speed Indicators (IVSI), or integrated with other displays such as Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicators (EHSI), navigation, or other multifunction displays. If the traffic display uses a multifunction display that is shared with other services such as ACARS, the traffic display function shall be immediately available for display by a single selection accessible to both pilots.

(c) Symbolology/Feature Criteria. The FAA has worked closely with the ATA, NASA, and both the SAE S-7 and G-10 Committees in an effort to standardize TCAS II symbolology and features. A consensus has been reached for TCAS II symbols and they are provided in RTCA DO-185A. Other symbolology and features may be used provided the applicant uses human factors technology to demonstrate that a clear and substantial benefit can be derived by its use. Otherwise, the traffic display must depict or provide the symbolology, features, or information provided in Section 2.2.6 of RTCA DO-185A.

(9) Resolution Display

(a) Purpose. The purpose of the resolution display is to provide each pilot with the information to readily correct the aircraft flight path or to prevent a maneuver that would significantly reduce the vertical separation between the pilot's aircraft (own aircraft) and a threat aircraft.

(b) Description. The resolution display may be integrated with the two primary IVSIs on the flight deck, integrated into the Primary Flight Display (PFD), or incorporated into a Heads-up Device (HUD). Descriptions and requirements for the various resolution display implementations are provided in Section 2.2.6 of RTCA DO-185A.

(c) Symbolology. The FAA has worked closely with the ATA, NASA, and both the SAE S-7 and G-10 Committees in an effort to standardize TCAS II RA features. A consensus has been reached for TCAS II RA displays and they are provided in RTCA DO-185A. Other symbolology and features may be used provided the applicant uses human factors technology to demonstrate that a clear and substantial benefit can be derived by its use. Otherwise, the RA display must depict or provide the symbolology, features, or information shown in Section 2.2.6 of RTCA DO-185A. The use of new TCAS symbolology will require testing throughout the flight envelope to determine accuracy, over/under shoot tendencies, flight technical error, and potential confusion with the proposed symbolology. Applicants pursuing the use of new symbolology should contact the appropriate FAA ACO early in the development cycle.

(d) Failures. Failure indications must be provided for TCAS failures (e.g., TCAS unable to generate RA's). Annunciation must be provided for the TA only mode. Electrical IVSI failures must also be annunciated.

(10) Caution/Warning Lights.

(a) Discrete caution and/or warning lights may be installed which are separate from the traffic display. The purpose of these additional indicators is to annunciate the presence of potentially threatening intruder aircraft at times when the pilot's attention may be diverted from the primary TCAS display. Two different discrete TCAS II annunciators have been used:

1 A discrete amber caution annunciator which indicates the presence of a TCAS II TA. Installation of this discrete caution annunciator is optional. If installed, it must be located in each pilot's primary field of view and be inhibited below 400 feet AGL.

2 A discrete red warning annunciator which indicates the presence of a TCAS II RA. This red warning must be located in each pilot's primary field of view and be inhibited below 900 feet AGL. An IVSI with a lighted red arc, or an alphanumeric message on the EADI is acceptable in lieu of this discrete warning annunciator.

(b) Because of the number of TCAS II advisories expected in service, the basic aircraft master caution and warning system should not be interfaced with these TCAS II caution/warning discretely. Overuse of the primary aircraft caution and warning system would tend to reduce its effectiveness in annunciating non-TCAS II system failures.

(c) Discrete visual alerts should remain on until canceled by the pilot or until the aircraft is no longer considered an intruder or a threat by TCAS II.

(11) Aural Alerts.

(a) Each TCAS II aural alert should be annunciated by a dedicated voice message over a cockpit speaker at a volume adequate for clear understanding at high cockpit noise levels, but not excessively loud at low noise levels. The evaluation includes the case where a flight crewmember is wearing a headset, covering the outboard ear when appropriate. In the case of turbo-prop aircraft where the aircrew utilizes headsets via the aircraft audio distribution panel, the aural messages should hold the same acceptable volume and intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise levels.

(b) The TCAS II Traffic Advisories (TA's) should be annunciated by the voice message "TRAFFIC, TRAFFIC" stated once for each TA.

(c) The TCAS II Resolution Advisories (RA's) should be annunciated by the following voice messages, as appropriate:

1 “CLIMB, CLIMB” Climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator.

2 “DESCEND, DESCEND” Descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator.

3 “MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED” Assure that vertical speed is out of the illuminated IVSI red arc or line, or other suitable indication.

4 “ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST” Modify the vertical speed to a value within the illuminated green arc or line, or outside the prohibited area on other suitable indications.

5 “CLEAR OF CONFLICT” Range is increasing, and separation is adequate; expeditiously return to the applicable clearance, unless otherwise directed by ATC.

6 “CLIMB, CROSSING CLIMB, CLIMB, CROSSING CLIMB” Climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Safe separation will best be achieved by climbing through the threat’s flight path.

7 “DESCEND, CROSSING DESCEND, DESCEND, CROSSING DESCEND” Descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Safe separation will best be achieved by descending through the threat’s flight path.

8 “MAINTAIN VERTICAL SPEED, MAINTAIN” Maintain the existing climb or descent rate as depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Safe separation will best be achieved by not altering the existing vertical speed.

9 “MAINTAIN VERTICAL SPEED, CROSSING MAINTAIN” Maintain the existing climb or descent rate as depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Safe separation will best be achieved by not altering the existing vertical speed and climbing or descending through the threat’s flight path.

(d) The following voice messages are required to annunciate enhanced TCAS II maneuvers when the initial RA does not provide sufficient vertical separation. The tone and inflection must connote increased urgency.

1 “INCREASE CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB” Climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Received after “CLIMB” advisory, and indicates an additional climb rate is required to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.

2 “INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT” Descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Received after “DESCEND” advisory, and indicates additional descent rate is required to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.

3 “CLIMB - CLIMB NOW, CLIMB - CLIMB NOW” Climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Received after a “DESCEND” resolution advisory and indicates a reversal in direction is required to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.

4 “DESCEND - DESCEND NOW, DESCEND - DESCEND NOW” Descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc or line on the IVSI or other suitable indicator. Received after a “CLIMB” resolution advisory and indicates a reversal in direction is required to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.

(e) All TCAS II aural alerts must be inhibited below 400 feet AGL.

(f) Both increases and decreases in the threat level must be aurally annunciated.

(g) In general, other messages which are clear and unambiguous will be evaluated on an individual basis. Messages which use negatives should not be used (for example, “DON’T CLIMB”).

d. Software Verification and Validation. The verification and validation of TCAS II software using the procedures outlined below are required for the first installation of a manufacturer’s TCAS II equipment. These procedures shall also be applied to subsequent software changes to a manufacturer’s TCAS II equipment. A manufacturer may provide a design that partitions the software which affects resolution advisories from other software such as that necessary for the traffic display. The TCAS II manufacturer may not use the minor change authority of the TSO system to change any software that is not partitioned from the software that affects resolution advisories.

(1) The verification and validation of the TCAS II software represents a unique challenge. The collision avoidance algorithms, commonly called “the CAS logic,” are specified in detail in a formal statechart representation in the CAS Requirements Specification (CRS) in Volume II of RTCA document DO-185A. In addition, Attachment A of Volume II provides a software design specification in pseudocode, which meets these requirements. This detail is required because the coordination algorithms in the CAS logic assume that the software implemented by all manufacturers will have exactly the same CAS logic. However, the surveillance software necessary to establish and maintain the relative tracks of nearby transponder equipped aircraft and the software necessary to provide the interface with the Mode S transponder and with other aircraft sensors and displays must be developed by the manufacturer of the TCAS II

equipment. This hybrid approach to the specification of the software requirements means that the application of the software criteria contained in RTCA document DO-178B for the detailed CAS requirements and the pseudocode software design have been satisfied by the FAA and its contractors, while the remaining requirements of DO-178B are the responsibility of the manufacturer.

(2) If software is used for the displays of TCAS II resolution advisories or in the operation of the Mode S transponder data link, the verification and validation of this software should be done to Level B, as defined in RTCA document DO-178B. These procedures should also be applied where the TCAS II manufacturer develops the software requirements for the TCAS II processor associated with functions other than surveillance or the CAS logic. Where the software design is specified by Volume II of RTCA document DO-185A, the manufacturer of the TCAS II processor should conduct code walk-throughs and develop and perform module tests and module integration tests to verify that the specified software design has been implemented correctly. This includes the surveillance software necessary to establish and maintain the relative tracks of nearby transponder equipped aircraft.

(3) The functional tests required by TSO C-119b as described in Volume I of RTCA document DO-185A, do not provide complete testing for the TCAS II processor software. However, coverage analysis performed on the CAS Test Suite, described in Volume I, has demonstrated that each column of every transition table and macro, and each identity transition in the CAS Requirements Specification in Volume II of DO-185A is tested by the CAS Test Suite. Thus the CAS Test Suite provides more than full decision coverage (but not full condition coverage) as defined in DO-178B. The TCAS II manufacturer must develop additional functional tests which correspond to the detailed requirements which it develops for the TCAS II processor. The potential consequences of software errors in the TCAS II processor or resolution display require that the manufacturer provide a structural coverage analysis to show single condition test coverage of all instructions at the source code which can affect the generation and display of resolution advisories. The tests which provide this may be a combination of module tests, module integration tests and functional tests.

(4) Equipment produced in accordance with a technical standard order may have obtained FAA concurrence that the software for the equipment was produced in accordance with the criteria of RTCA document DO-178B for a particular software level. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the applicant who first installs a manufacturer's TCAS II equipment in an aircraft to demonstrate to the appropriate FAA ACO that the system software used for the TCAS II equipment, Mode S transponder and new sensors and displays necessary to provide resolution advisories have been developed in accordance with the criteria outlined above. Data from the TSO process may be sufficient to establish that the appropriate verification and validation have been accomplished, but the ACO may require additional tests and analysis of the software for the installed TCAS II system. Subsequent installations of the same TCAS II equipment

on other aircraft types do not require any additional verification if the software is not changed.

e. System Safety Analyses. Unannounced failures of the TCAS II equipment or its associated transponder, sensors or displays that generate resolution advisories must be improbable. Unannounced failures of the TCAS II equipment or its associated transponder, sensors or displays that generate resolution advisories that would cause midair collisions or other catastrophes must be extremely improbable. An operational safety assessment should be conducted to establish that a TCAS II false resolution advisory is improbable and that the probability that it will cause a catastrophe is extremely improbable. This should be accomplished using the methods described in AC 25.1309-1A, System Design and Analysis. It is expected that a functional hazard assessment (FHA), a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and a quantitative probability analysis of the TCAS II equipment, Mode S transponder, displays and sensors (including altitude information sources) will be necessary to establish that a false resolution advisory is improbable and that the likelihood it will cause a catastrophe is extremely improbable. These analyses should be provided for the first installation of a particular model of TCAS II equipment. Subsequent installations of the same equipment in other aircraft may make use of the same analyses with particular attention to the differences in own altitude sensors.

f. Test and Evaluation (Initial Approval). Testing of the first of a manufacturer's TCAS II system for its initial approval in an aircraft should be conducted. This will verify that the design and installation performs its intended function under the expected operating conditions, and that there are no adverse interactions between the TCAS II and existing aircraft systems. The test will also show that prior approvals of present aircraft equipment have not been compromised. The applicant should provide a test plan that includes adequate testing to perform this verification. This test plan will generally require a combination of ground tests, basic flight tests, and flight tests involving planned encounters with another TCAS II equipped aircraft. The use of other than a transport category aircraft for either the TCAS II installation or for the air-to-air cooperative flights is acceptable. The test plan should contain, as a minimum, the following elements:

(1) Basic Ground Tests.

(a) Bearing Accuracy Tests. Bearing estimation accuracy of the TCAS II system shall be demonstrated as installed in the aircraft. The bearing accuracy may be measured using a calibrated antenna range that allows precise echo controlled, far field, angle-of-arrival measurements at or slightly above zero degrees elevation and over 360 degrees in azimuth. The bearing accuracy may also be measured using a fixed transponder location while rotating the test aircraft on a compass rose while measuring the bearing angles at 30 degree intervals. Alternately, the airplane is fixed and the transponder may be moved (see appendix 2 for cautionary note on testing). Manual readout of the bearing estimate may be done directly from a plan position display on the traffic advisory display. Alternatively, the bearing estimates may be automatically recorded or may be read from a

special test display. A maximum error of ± 15 degrees in azimuth is acceptable; however, larger errors are acceptable in the area of the tail (e.g., within ± 45 degrees of the tail) when that area is not visible from the cockpit. In this case, aircraft structure may interfere with the signal path.

(b) Sensor failures. Simulated failures of the aircraft sensors integrated with TCAS II should be evaluated to determine that the resulting system failure state agrees with the predicted results. These tests should be part of the ground test plan.

(c) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI). A flight deck EMI survey should be made to determine that the TCAS II equipment is not a source of objectionable conducted or radiated interference to previously installed systems or equipment, and that operation of the TCAS II equipment is not adversely affected by conducted or radiated interference from previously installed systems and equipment. Attention should be given to possible interference with TCAS II equipment from weather radar, particularly if operating in the C-band.

(d) Evaluate the general arrangement and operation of controls, displays, circuit breakers, annunciators, and placards of the TCAS system.

(e) Self-Test. Evaluate the TCAS self-test features and failure mode displays and annunciators.

(f) Verify that the pressure altitude source and radio altimeter are properly interfaced with the TCAS equipment.

(g) Verify that the windshear and GPWS/TAWS warnings and TCAS II voice alerts are compatible. Also, verify that windshear or GPWS/TAWS warnings can be clearly understood and that TCAS II is automatically switched to the TA Only Mode when TCAS II and windshear voice or GPWS/TAWS announcements simultaneously occur. The alert priorities should be windshear, GPWS/TAWS and then TCAS II.

(h) Verify the performance of TCAS II traffic display by observing any available area traffic.

(i) Evaluate the TCAS II system installation for satisfactory identification, accessibility, and visibility during both day and night conditions.

(j) Determine that any configuration discretely associated with the TCAS II logic, including inhibits of climb RA's, operate properly. (Changes in logic or function with aircraft configuration, altitude, or speed.)

(k) Verify that the Mode S identification code and maximum airspeed are correct.

(l) If connected, verify that the altitude alerter is providing correct data to TCAS and that the TCAS II logic correctly weakens or strengthens the displayed RA using the altitude alerter input.

(2) Basic Flight Tests.

(a) During all phases of flight, determine if there is any mutual interference with any other aircraft system. All installed systems, including the weather radar, should be operating during the flight test.

(b) Evaluate TCAS II aural messages for acceptable volume and intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise levels (idle descent at low speed and high power at V_{mo}) with headset covering outboard ear only (when appropriate) and without headsets. In the case of turbo-prop aircraft where the aircrew utilizes headsets via the aircraft audio distribution panel, the aural messages should hold the same acceptable volume and intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise levels. If the TCAS II TEST is used to simulate voice announcements, ensure that the audio level is not changed by use of the TEST function

(c) Demonstrate that traffic information remains valid and usable when the aircraft is pitched ± 15 degrees and rolled approximately 30 degrees of bank during normal maneuvers by observing area traffic in the traffic advisory display.

(d) Evaluate the effective surveillance range of the traffic display, including target azimuth reasonableness and track stability. Use of targets of opportunity or a nontransport (low speed) aircraft as a target for these tests is permissible.

(e) Determine that any configuration discrettes associated with the TCAS II logic including inhibits of climb RA's, operate properly unless previously demonstrated during ground tests. (Changes in logic or function with aircraft configuration, altitude, or speed.)

(f) Perform the additional flight tests in Paragraph 3.4.4 of DO-185A unless previously accomplished under TSO-C119b.

(g) Evaluate TCAS for noninterference during coupled Autopilot and Flight Director approaches to the lowest minimums approved for the aircraft.

(h) Prior to any cooperative flight tests at any altitude involving the TCAS II equipped aircraft and another aircraft, both aircraft should be flown in close formation to assure matched altimetry readouts. These checks should be flown at the speeds and altitudes to be used for the tests.

(i) Evaluate all selectable modes of the TCAS II to determine that they perform their intended function and that the operating mode is clearly and uniquely annunciated.

(j) Re-evaluate any previously installed aircraft systems that have required changes as a result of the TCAS II installation. (such as EFIS, FD, PFD, ND, IVSI, interface, etc.)

(3) Planned Encounter Flight Tests. The objective of these flight tests is to demonstrate adequate TCAS II surveillance and to verify smooth, predictable TCAS II performance. Having established appropriate safety rules, static system leak test (if necessitated by having opened the system), and altimeter correlation between the encounter aircraft and the TCAS aircraft. The following encounters between the TCAS II aircraft and a dedicated intruder aircraft should be flown to insure that the TCAS II aircraft system performs its intended function by generating TA's and RA's and is consistent with RTCA document DO-185A. The intruder aircraft should be equipped with transponders capable of Mode A, Mode C, and for those tests making it necessary, Mode S, and TCAS II. These tests are also intended to expose the installed TCAS II system to a reasonable number of carefully controlled encounters which are likely in service. This matrix covers the envelope of encounter speeds, altitudes, and geometries which have in the past identified flaws in surveillance, logic, and antenna mechanization that were not detected earlier by bench tests.

(a) Intruder overtaking TCAS II aircraft (from the aft quadrants).

(b) Head-on.

1 Low and high closure speeds.

2 Above climb limit, TCAS II to TCAS II.

3 TCAS II against Mode C with TCAS II above intruder and above climb limit (intent is to force TCAS II aircraft to descend.)

4 At 3000 feet over calm water to evaluate multipath protection.

(c) Converging.

(d) Crossing (intruder above TCAS II, descending or vice versa.)

(e) Evaluate the TA only mode during planned encounters.

(f) A mix of intruder transponder modes (A, C, and S) should be evaluated, but primary emphasis should be on TCAS II to TCAS II coordination, and on Mode C replies from the intruder aircraft.

(g) Evaluate a mix of encounters with TCAS II both above and below the intruder.

(h) If a flight test is necessary to insure compatibility with other designs, verify correct air-to-air coordination between the test TCAS II and another manufacturer's previously approved equipment (see paragraph 3c(5)).

(i) Evaluate the effect of electrical transients (bus transfer), during encounters. The TCAS II should not experience adverse effects. No false TA's or RA's should be generated as a result of electrical transients. Normal TCAS II functions and displays should be restored within approximately three seconds.

(4) Mode S Transponder Flight Tests. The flight tests described by this section may be used to obtain the certification of a stand alone Mode S transponder installation. These tests should also be used to evaluate a Mode S transponder, which is intended for use with a TCAS II installation. The tests primarily verify that the installed antenna(s) are compatible with the Mode S transponder and provide an adequate response to ground radar interrogations during normal aircraft maneuvers. In addition, the flight test is a demonstration that the Mode S transponder functions properly as installed and does not interfere with other aircraft electronic equipment. The need for a detailed flight test is reduced when the Mode S Transponder and antenna installation is identical or similar to that of previously approved ATCRBS transponder installation.

(a) If the Mode S transponder uses a top mounted antenna in addition to a bottom mounted antenna which is installed at or near the same location used by a previously approved ATCRBS transponder antenna, conduct a comprehensive ground test in accordance with Appendix 3 and conduct a functional flight test. The transponder code, altitude reporting and "IDENT" features of the transponder should be exercised during normal maneuvering. There should be no objectionable behavior observed by the ground controller.

(b) If a Mode S transponder is installed in an aircraft which does not have a previously approved ATCRBS transponder installation, or that uses a bottom mounted antenna location which differs significantly from that used by a previously approved ATCRBS transponder antenna, the following ground and flight tests should be conducted.

1 Conduct Ground Tests Per Appendix 2.

2 Climb and Distance Coverage. Beginning at a distance of at least 10 NM from, and an altitude of 2000 to 3000 feet above that of the radar facility and using a transponder code assigned by the ATC, fly on a heading that will pass the aircraft over the facility. At a distance of 5 to 10 NM beyond the facility, fly the aircraft at its normal maximum climb attitude to within 90 percent of the maximum altitude for which the aircraft is certificated, maintaining the aircraft at a heading within 5 degrees of the track from the radar facility. After reaching the maximum altitude for which the aircraft is certificated, fly level at the maximum altitude to 160 NM for turbojet and some turboprop powered airplanes (or 80 NM for most other aircraft) from the nearest radar facility. (Distance from the radar facility is a function of the airplane's maximum certificated

altitude.) Communicate with the ground radar personnel for evidence of transponder dropout. During the flight, check the “IDENT” mode of the ATC transponder to assure that it is performing its intended function. There should be no dropouts (no return for two or more sweeps). Uncontrollable ringing that hinders use of the ground radar is unsatisfactory.

3 Long Range Reception. At 90 percent of maximum certificated altitude perform left and right 360 degree turns, at bank angles of 8 to 10 degrees. The aircraft should be at least 160 (or 80) NM from the nearest radar facility. During these turns, the radar displays should be monitored and there should be no signal dropouts (no return for 2 or more sweeps).

4 High Angle Reception. Perform two 360 degree turns, one to the right and one to the left, at bank angles of 8 to 10 degrees with the airplane at a distance of 50 to 70 NM from the nearest radar facility and at an altitude of at least 35,000 feet or within 90 percent of the maximum altitude for which the aircraft is certificated. There should be no dropouts (no return for 2 or more sweeps). Switch the transponder to a code not selected by the ground controller. The aircraft secondary return should disappear from the scope. The controller should then change his control box to “common sense” and a single slash should appear on the scope at the aircraft’s position.

5 High Altitude Cruise. Within 90 percent of the aircraft’s maximum certificated altitude or its maximum operating altitude beginning at a point 160 (or 80) NM from the nearest radar facility fly on a course which will pass over the radar facility. There should be no transponder dropout or “ring around.”

6 Surveillance Approach. Beginning at or above 90 percent of the maximum certificated altitude of the aircraft, perform a letdown and approach to a runway of an airport served by Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) having an ATRBS facility. The approach should be made at the maximum normal rate of descent. Normal approach and landing configuration for the aircraft should continue down to an altitude of 200 feet or less above the ground radar antenna elevation. Not more than one dropout should occur for any 10 sweeps during final approach. Uncontrolled ringing that hinders use of the ground radar is unsatisfactory.

7 Holding and Orbiting Patterns.

(aa) At an altitude of 2000 feet above the radar antenna or minimum obstruction clearance altitude (whichever is greater) with landing flaps and gear extended, fly left and right 360 degree turns approximately 10 miles from the radar facility. There should be no signal dropouts.

(bb) At an altitude of 2000 feet above the radar antenna or minimum obstruction clearance altitude (whichever is greater) fly 45 degree sectors of left and right

10 mile orbital patterns around a radar facility with gear and landing flaps extended. There should be no signal dropouts.

8 Altitude Reporting. Conduct a functional test of the altitude encoder by comparison with ATC displayed altitudes. Verify correspondence at several altitudes between ATC readings and the Captain's altimeter, when set at or corrected to 29.92 inches of mercury (or equivalent).

g. Follow-On Approvals (STC or Amended TC). Flight testing of TCAS II systems for follow-on approvals (previously approved TCAS II equipment installed in a different aircraft type) should be conducted to verify that the design and installation performs its intended function under the expected operating conditions, that there are no adverse interactions between the TCAS II and existing aircraft systems, and that prior approvals of present aircraft equipment have not been compromised. The applicant should provide a test plan including adequate aircraft ground testing to perform the verification that the design and installation performs its intended function when installed in a different aircraft type under the expected operating conditions, that there are no adverse interactions between the TCAS II and existing aircraft systems, and that prior approvals of present aircraft equipment have not been compromised. This test plan will generally require a combination of ground tests, basic flight tests, and flight tests involving planned encounters with a Mode C equipped aircraft, or the use of a suitably located fixed transponder. The test plan should contain, as a minimum, the following elements:

(1) Ground Tests.

(a) Evaluate the general arrangement and operation of controls, displays, circuit breakers, annunciators, and placards of the TCAS II system.

(b) Evaluate the TCAS II self-test features and failure mode displays and annunciators.

(c) Verify that the pressure altitude source and radio altimeter are properly interfaced with the TCAS II equipment.

(d) Measure the performance of the directional antenna for 360 degrees coverage at 30 degree intervals, as specified under basic certification ground tests.

(e) Evaluate the TCAS II system installation for satisfactory identification, accessibility, and visibility during both day and night conditions.

(f) Determine that any configuration discretely associated with the TCAS II logic, including inhibits of climb RA's, operate properly. (Changes in logic or function with aircraft configuration, altitude, or speed.)

(g) Verify that the Mode S identification code and maximum airspeed are correct.

(h) Verify that the windshear and GPWS/TAWS warnings and TCAS II voice alerts are compatible. Also, verify that windshear and GPWS/TAWS warnings can be clearly understood and that TCAS II is automatically switched to the TA Only mode when TCAS II and windshear voice or GPWS/TAWS announcements simultaneously occur. The alert priorities should be windshear, GPWS/TAWS and then TCAS II.

(i) If connected, verify that the altitude alerter is providing correct data to TCAS and that the TCAS II logic correctly weakens or strengthens the displayed RA using the altitude alerter input.

(2) Flight Tests.

(a) TCAS II, change 7.0 units with TSO-C119b approval have complied with the certification flight test requirements contained in AC 20-131(x) section f, Test and Evaluation (initial approval). Aircraft equipped with TCAS II version 6.04a do not require any additional FAA certification flight tests to obtain a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for TCAS II change 7.0 installations. The appropriate aircraft ground tests are sufficient to ensure the successful installation of the TCAS II change 7.0 software load.

(b) The certification flight test requirements contained in AC 20-131(x) section f, Test and Evaluation (initial approval) should be successfully completed prior to initial approval of TSO C-119b. Follow-on installations of TCAS II change 7.0 units (TSO C-119b approved) which replace existing TCAS II version 6.04a units do not require additional FAA certification flight tests. Additional certification flight tests are not required for follow-on STCs because the aircraft installation requirements for TCAS II version 6.04a and TCAS change 7.0 are identical. In addition, TCAS version 6.04a and change 7.0 are functionally interchangeable.

(c) The certification policy for follow-on approvals (STC or Amended STC) of TCAS II change 7.0 is that flight test is not required, provided the appropriate testing on the ground to certify that change 7.0 has been correctly installed and that any new interfaces operate correctly with the TCAS II logic.

(d) In the event certification flight testing is deemed to be required, the following may be demonstrated.

1 Proper operation of the traffic display should be verified by observing proximate traffic, at least one traffic advisory and at least one resolution advisory. Confirm that the appropriate aural alerts occur correctly with the traffic advisory and resolution advisory. The advisories may be generated by:

(aa) Planned encounters with an intruder aircraft operating a transponder with Mode C capability.

NOTE: Prior to any cooperative flight tests at any altitude involving the TCAS II equipped aircraft and another aircraft, both aircraft should be flown in close formation to assure matched altimetry readouts. These checks should be flown at the speeds and altitudes to be used for the tests.

(bb) Encounters with an operating Mode C transponder installed at a fixed ground location which reports an appropriate test altitude.

(cc) Encounters with aircraft targets of opportunity.

(dd) The use of suitable test equipment, during ground tests.

2 During all phases of flight, determine if there is any mutual interference with any other aircraft system.

3 Evaluate TCAS II aural messages for acceptable volume and intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise levels (idle descent at low speed and high power at V_{mo}) with and without headsets, covering the outboard ear where appropriate. In the case of turbo-prop aircraft where the aircrew utilizes headsets via the aircraft audio distribution panel, the aural messages should hold the same acceptable volume and intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise levels. If the TCAS II TEST is used to simulate voice announcements, ensure that the audio level is not changed by use of the TEST function.

4 Evaluate the effective surveillance range of the traffic display, including target azimuth reasonableness and track stability. Use of a nontransport (low speed) Mode C equipped aircraft as a target or a fixed transponder or suitable test equipment for these tests is permissible.

5 Evaluate the Mode S transponder air-to-ground ATCRBS function against an appropriate ground facility.

6 Determine that any configuration discretely associated with the TCAS II logic including inhibits of aural annunciations and RA's, operate properly unless previously demonstrated during ground tests. (Changes in logic or function with aircraft configuration, altitude, or speed.)

7 Evaluate TCAS II for noninterference during coupled Autopilot and Flight Director approaches to the lowest minimums approved for the aircraft.

8 Evaluate all selectable modes of the TCAS II to determine that they perform their intended function.

9 Reevaluate any previously installed aircraft systems that have required changes as a result of the TCAS II installation (such as EFIS, FD, PFD, ND, IVSI, interface, etc.)

h. Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS). The AFMS should provide the appropriate system limitations and procedures, and a comprehensive description of all normal modes of operation including what actions are expected by the flight crew in each case. Appendix 1 provides an example of the elements and extent of detail that may be shown by a typical AFMS (specific performance data and procedures may vary with system design and aircraft type).

10. OPERATIONAL APPROVAL. Operational approval of TCAS II is addressed by AC 120-55B.

David W. Hempe
Acting Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT

1. INTRODUCTION.

Descriptive material and procedures in this AFMS example may, when appropriate, be replaced by reference in the AFMS to the TCAS II equipment supplier's pilot operating guide. However, the AFMS reference to this guide must be specific; that is, date, revision level; and not open ended, such as, "or later revision." Unless the pilot's guide is specifically FAA approved. Also, the AFMS must define the specific configuration approved from the various options contained in the pilot's guide; for example, which model control panel, whether the pilot initiated self-test is available in flight, range features, TA vertical display features, etc. (Example for an aircraft equipped with IVSI/RA displays).

2. DESCRIPTION.

a. The TCAS II is an on-board collision avoidance and traffic situation display system with computer processing to identify and display intruding and threatening collision aircraft, and issue resolution advisories in the form of vertical maneuver guidance on the pilot and copilot's instantaneous vertical speed indicators (IVSI). From the transponder replies, TCAS II determines relative altitude, range, and bearing of any ATCRBS or Mode S equipped aircraft with altitude reporting. From this, TCAS II will determine the level of advisory using standardized algorithms. The TCAS II will resolve multiple aircraft encounters. ATCRBS equipped aircraft which only reply with Mode A information will not provide altitude information; therefore, TCAS II will not issue resolution advisories for these aircraft but can issue traffic advisories. The TCAS II will not detect aircraft without transponders.

b. The TCAS II installation consists of one TCAS II processor, one top mounted directional antenna, one bottom mounted blade (or directional antenna), one Mode S transponder with control panel and top and bottom antennas, one traffic advisory display with control panel (if not combined with the IVSI/RA indicators), two resolution advisory displays, one overhead speaker for voice messages, (caution/warning lights), and associated wiring.

c. The TCAS II provides two levels of advisories:

(1) If the traffic gets within 25 to 45 seconds, depending upon altitude, of projected Closest Point of Approach (CPA), it is then considered an intruder, and an aural and visual traffic advisory (TA) is issued. This level calls attention to what may develop into a collision threat using the traffic advisory display and the voice message, "TRAFFIC - TRAFFIC." It permits mental and physical preparation for a possible maneuver to follow and assists the pilot in achieving visual acquisition of the intruding aircraft.

(2) If the intruder gets within 20 to 35 seconds, depending upon altitude, of CPA, it is considered a threat, and an aural and visual resolution advisory (RA) is issued. This level provides a recommended vertical maneuver using modified IVSIs and voice messages to provide

adequate vertical separation from the threat aircraft or prevents initiation of a maneuver that would place the TCAS II aircraft in jeopardy.

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED

d. The TCAS II is considered a backup system to the “SEE AND AVOID” concept and the ATC radar environment.

e. The TCAS II resolution advisories are annunciated by the following voice messages, as appropriate, along with the expected pilot response:

(1) “CLIMB, CLIMB” Climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc on the IVSI, nominally between 1,500 and 2,000 fpm.

(2) “DESCEND, DESCEND” Descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc on the IVSI nominally between 1,500 and 2,000 fpm.

(3) “MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED” Assure that vertical speed is out of the illuminated IVSI red arc until the RA is completed.

(4) “ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST” Reduce vertical speed to a value within the illuminated green arc.

(5) “CLEAR OF CONFLICT” Range is increasing, and separation is adequate; expeditiously return to the applicable ATC clearance, unless otherwise directed by ATC.

(6) “CLIMB, CROSSING CLIMB, CLIMB, CROSSING CLIMB” Climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc on the IVSI, nominally between 1,500 and 2,000 fpm. Safe separation will best be achieved by climbing through the threat’s flight path.

(7) “DESCEND, CROSSING DESCEND, DESCEND, CROSSING DESCEND” Descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc on the IVSI, nominally between 1,500 and 2,000 fpm. Safe separation will best be achieved by descending through the intruder’s flight path.

(8) “MAINTAIN VERTICAL SPEED, MAINTAIN” Continue the existing climb or descent rate, or other vertical speed, as depicted by the green (fly to) arc on the IVSI.

(9) “MAINTAIN VERTICAL SPEED, CROSSING MAINTAIN” Continue the existing climb or descent rate, or other vertical speed, as depicted by the green (fly to) arc on the IVSI. Safe separation will best be achieved by not altering the existing vertical speed and climbing or descending through the threat’s flight path.

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED


f. The following voice messages annunciate enhanced TCAS II maneuvers when the initial RA does not provide sufficient vertical separation. The tone and inflection connote increased urgency.

(1) “INCREASE CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB” Climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc on the IVSI, nominally between 2,500 and 3,000 fpm. Received after “CLIMB” advisory, and indicates additional climb rate is required to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.


(2) “INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT” Descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc on the IVSI, nominally between 2,500 and 3,000 fpm. Received after “DESCEND” advisory, and indicates additional descent rate is required to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.






(3) “CLIMB - CLIMB NOW, CLIMB - CLIMB NOW” Climb at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc on the IVSI, nominally between 1,500 and 2,000 fpm. Received after a “DESCEND” resolution advisory and indicates a reversal in sense is required to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.

(4) “DESCEND - DESCEND NOW, DESCEND - DESCEND NOW” Descend at the rate depicted by the green (fly to) arc on the IVSI, nominally between 1,500 and 2,000 fpm. Received after a “CLIMB” resolution advisory and indicates a reversal in sense is required to achieve safe vertical separation from a maneuvering threat aircraft.

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED**Figure 1: TCAS/Transponder Control Panel (Example)****Table 1: TCAS/Transponder Function Selector**

TEST	Holding the TCAS/Transponder function selector in TEST for 2 to 3 seconds will activate the system sequence. In the TEST position, maintenance messages may be read on the display. Discretion must be used when selecting TEST in flight, since both TCAS II and the transponder will be inhibited for approximately 20 seconds. The function selector is spring loaded to STBY.
STBY	Activates TCAS II and XPDR warmup cycles.
XPDR	Transponder is on. TCAS II is in warmup cycle.
TA	Transponder is on. Only the "Traffic Advisory", or "TA" function of the TCAS II is on. No "Resolution Advisories" will be received in this position. The written warning "TA ONLY" will appear on the display, and the yellow "RA OFF" flag will be in view on both IVSIs.
TA/RA	Transponder is on. All TCAS II functions are on. No TCAS flags should be present on either IVSI.
XPDR Fail Light (Red)	Indicates a transponder system failure when the transponder is on. Comes on during "TEST", but goes off after approximately 3 seconds if the transponder is OK.
Code Indicator	Indicates code selected with the code selectors.
IDENT	Causes the word IDENT to flash in the aircraft data block on the ATC display.
ALT RPTG	Provides automatic altitude reporting to ATC.
Code Selectors	Select the transponder code. Left and right selectors consist of a large knob and a small knob. Each knob controls one digit of the code.

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED**Figure 2: TCAS II – Traffic Display (Example)****Table 2 – Displayed Aircraft Symbols (Examples)**

Arrow indicates that the target is climbing ↑ or descending ↓ at a rate of at least 500 fpm.	
Relative altitude is displayed in the proximity of the aircraft symbol in hundreds of feet. A “+” preceding the relative altitude indicates the target is above you and a “-“ indicates it is below you.	
	Unfilled white diamond. Non-threatening traffic without altitude reporting. If altitude reporting, the altitude data will be displayed.
+07 	Solid White diamond. Proximity traffic 700 feet above. Non-threatening, altitude reporting traffic within 1200 feet vertically and 6nm horizontally. Aircraft without altitude reporting will be assumed to be so-altitude and will be displayed as a solid diamond when within 6nm even though they may not be within 1200 feet vertically.
 ↓ -03	Solid yellow circle. “TA”, 300 feet below, descending with a rate of at least 500 fpm.
 +00	Solid red square. “RA”, level at your altitude.
	Ownship. Airplane symbol in white just below the center of CRT. On a dedicated display or when in the TFC Mode on a combination TCAS/RADAR Display.
(Compass Arc)	This arc is repeater of the Captains compass. (Not required for TCAS II Display)
(Range Rings)	3nm – Small ring with ticks at clock positions 5 NM – Large ring made of dots.

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED

Figure 3: TCAS II – Traffic Display (Example)




Table 3 – Paddle Switch REL ALT/FL Switch

REL ALT	Paddle switch is spring loaded to the center position. Display shows REL ALT in hundreds of feet above (+) or below (-) your aircraft.
FL	Allows display of traffic flight levels, referenced to 29.92, for 15 seconds. Your FL is displayed in lower left corner. Three digits are shown, except for negative flight levels which are shown as -xxx. When the current barometric pressure is not available and the TCAS II aircraft is below FL 180, the FL position is automatically inhibited.
RANGE	The maximum forward range on the traffic display is set at range selected by the range knob. Ranges of 3,4,10,20 NM are available and the selected range is annunciated on the traffic display.
BRT Knob	Controls brightness of the display


Table 4 - Above/Norm/Below Switch

ABOVE	Displays altitude reporting traffic from 2700 feet below to 9900 feet above the TCAS II aircraft. The selection of this mode is annunciated by ABOVE being displayed on the traffic display.
NORM	Displays altitude reporting traffic from 2700 feet below to 2700 feet above the TCAS II aircraft.
BELOW	Displays altitude-reporting traffic from 2700 feet above to 9900 feet below the TCAS II aircraft. The selection of this mode is annunciated by BELOW being displayed on the traffic display.

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED

3. OFF-SCALE TRAFFIC ADVISORY. If TCAS II tracks an intruder that is outside the range of the display but has entered the Caution or Warning areas, one-half of the appropriate symbol will appear at the appropriate bearing at the edge of the display area. The symbol will appear in its proper color and have its data tag displayed, providing there is room. For example, a TA intruder with a high closure rate, and which is directly ahead and 300 feet below your airplane will appear as an amber-filled half circle at the 12 o'clock position on the edge of the display area. The data tag “-03” will appear below the half symbol. If this intruder is above your altitude, the data tag is not visible. An off-scale RA intruder will appear as a red-filled half square with data tag displayed if room permits.


4. NO BEARING ADVISORIES. When TCAS II cannot track the bearing of an intruder, the traffic advisory will appear in the lower center of the display just below the own-airplane symbol. The advisory will present appropriate color coded traffic information. This phenomenon usually is caused either by temporary antenna shielding (caused by steep bank angles) or a failure in the TCAS II bearing antenna. Up to two lines of information can be displayed. “TA 5.2-06↑” for example means an intruder is creating a Traffic Advisory 5.2 nautical miles away, 600 feet below, and climbing in excess of 500 FPM. “RA 0.6 00” means resolution advisory traffic is 0.6 nautical miles away at the same altitude. TCAS II’s ability to compute a Traffic or Resolution Advisory is NOT degraded by lack of bearing information.

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED**Figure 4: TCAS II Instantaneous Vertical Speed Indicator (Example)****Table 5 - INSTANTANEOUS VERTICAL SPEED INDICATOR**

Indicates vertical speed in feet per minute. The IVSI is a normal instantaneous vertical speed indicator, and the presence of the lights or the flags will not interfere with the ability of the needle to indicate vertical speeds.	
	RED/GREEN EYEBROW LIGHTS. Eyebrow lights are invisible until they illuminate as part of a TCAS II “RESOLUTION ADVISORY”, or system “TEST”. These lights indicate a vertical speed regime which will provide safe traffic separation. The green lights from a wider band than red lights.
IVSI Status Window Flags	
TCAS 	BLACK. Normal operation
TCAS 	AMBER FLAG. Indicates Unusable TCAS II information.
TCAS 	WHITE “RA OFF” FLAG. Always displayed when TCAS/TRANSPONDER function selector is in STBY, XPDR, or TA. Will also be displayed with selector in RA/TA if “RA’s” are inhibited and/or inoperative

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED**Figure 5: TCAS II Examples – Preventive RA's**


NOTE: No change in vertical speed is required when these RA's are issued.



(a) Preventive

Aural: MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED


Pilot Response: No action required. Maintain the vertical speed within the green arc.



(b) Preventive

Aural: MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED

Pilot Response: No Action Required. If a decent is initiated, it must be limited to less than 500 fpm



(c) Preventive

Aural: MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED

Pilot Response: No action required. Descent rate can not be greater than 2,000 fpm.



Red Arc




Green Arc

Key to Colors in Figures

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED**Figure 6: TCAS II Examples – Initial Corrective RA's**


NOTE: Pilot response to these initial corrective RA's is expected within 5 seconds. Pilots should promptly and smoothly fly to the green arc.



(a) Corrective

Aural: DESCEND, DESCEND


Pilot Response: Smoothly establish a descent rate between 1,500 fpm and 2,000 fpm.



(b) Corrective

Aural: CLIMB, CLIMB

Pilot Response: Smoothly establish a climb rate between 1,500 fpm and 2,000 fpm.



(c) Corrective

Aural: ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST

Pilot Response: Smoothly reduce vertical speed to less than 500 fpm.



Red Arc




Green Arc

Key to Colors in Figures

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED**Figure 7: TCAS II Examples – Modifications to Initial Corrective RA's**


NOTE: Pilot response to these modified RA's is expected within 2.5 seconds. Pilots should promptly and smoothly fly to the green arc.



(a) Increase

Aural: INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT


Pilot Response: Increase the descent rate, fly to the green arc, 2,500 fpm to 3,000 fpm.



(b) Reversal

Aural: CLIMB, CLIMB NOW

Pilot Response: Reverse descent rate and immediately start a climb between 1,500 fpm and 2,000 fpm.



(c) Weakening

Aural: ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED ADJUST

Pilot Response: Smoothly reduce the vertical speed Between 0 and 250 fpm.



Red Arc



Green Arc

Key to Colors in Figures

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED

5. SECTION I – LIMITATIONS.

- a. Pilots are authorized to deviate from their current ATC clearance to the extent necessary to comply with a TCAS II resolution advisory (RA).
- b. Maneuvers based solely on a traffic advisory (TA) or on information displayed on the traffic display are not authorized.

6. SECTION II - EMERGENCY PROCEDURES. No change from basic airplane flight manual.

7. SECTION III – PROCEDURES.

a. TCAS II Flight Procedures:

(1) Compliance with a TCAS II resolution advisory (RA) is necessary unless the pilot considers it unsafe to do so, or unless the pilot has better information about the cause of the RA and can maintain safe separation (for example, an obvious TCAS II system failure, etc.).

NOTE: CAUTION. Once a non-crossing RA has been issued, safe operation could be compromised if current vertical speed is changed, except as necessary to comply with the RA. This is because TCAS II to TCAS II coordination may be in progress with the intruder airplane, and any change in vertical speed that does not comply with the RA may negate the effectiveness of the other airplane's compliance with its RA.

NOTE: WARNING. Noncompliance with a crossing RA by one airplane may result in reduced vertical separation; therefore, safe horizontal separation must also be assured by visual means.

(2) Because of the limited number of inputs to TCAS II for airplane performance inhibits, in some instances where inhibiting RA's may be appropriate it is not possible to do so. In these cases, TCAS II may command maneuvers which may significantly reduce stall margins or result in stall warning. Therefore, the stall warning stick shaker must be respected when following an RA. Conditions where this may occur include:

- (a) Bank angle in excess of 15 degrees.
- (b) One engine inoperative.
- (c) Abnormal configurations such as landing gear not retractable, etc.

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED

(d) Leaving airplane in inappropriate configurations when climb RA occurs.

(e) Operation at airports outside of 0 to 5,300 feet MSL or temperatures outside of ISA $\pm 50^{\circ}\text{F}$ (27.8°C).

(f) Speeds below normal operating speeds.

(g) Buffet margin less than 0.3 g.

(3) The TCAS II RA algorithms are based on the pilot initiating the initial 0.25 g acceleration maneuver within approximately 5 seconds. Pilot response is expected within approximately 2-1/2 seconds if an additional RA is issued. (The increase rate and rate reversal RA's are based on a 0.35 g acceleration maneuver.) Because of these requirements and the rate limits of the autopilots, all RA responses must be hand-flown and not with the autopilot or autothrottles engaged.

NOTE: Evasive maneuvering must be limited to the minimum required to comply with the RA. Excessive responses to RA's are not desirable or appropriate because of other potential traffic and ATC consequences. From level flight, proper response to an RA typically results in an overall altitude deviation of 300 to 500 feet in order to successfully resolve a traffic conflict

(4) Modified advisories are posted after the response to an initial advisory has been completed and the TCAS II airplane is projected to have adequate altitude separation from the intruder. The initial RA is said to weaken, indicating a return towards the original flight path or clearance is allowed. When the initial advisory weakens, the green arc is repositioned to indicate level flight, the magnitude of the red arc decreased, and "ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST" is announced. The modified RA indicates a return to level flight so that the altitude displacement in response to the initial RA can be minimized. This RA will remain displayed until the "CLEAR OF CONFLICT" aural annunciation is issued. Following the weakening advisory will greatly reduce the ultimate altitude deviation caused by the original corrective resolution advisory.

(5) If a "CLIMB" RA is issued while in the landing configuration, initiate normal go-around procedures.

NOTE: Initiating go-around procedure for a "CLIMB" RA does not mandate a missed approach. It is intended to assure the airplane is properly configured for the TCAS II maneuver. In most cases, the TCAS II event will be resolved with only minor deviation to the intended flight path, and sufficient time and altitude may exist to recover safely to the desired flight path.

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED

(6) The pilot should not initiate evasive maneuvers using information from the traffic display only or on a traffic advisory (TA) only without visually sighting the traffic. These displays and advisories are intended only for assistance in visually locating the traffic and lack the flight path trends necessary for use in evasive maneuvering. However, while climbing or descending, modest changes in vertical speed based on traffic display information is not considered evasive maneuvering.

(7) After deviating from an ATC clearance or instruction in response to a TCAS II RA, notify ATC of the deviation as soon as possible.

(8) Following a TCAS II “CLEAR OF CONFLICT” advisory, the pilot should expeditiously return to the applicable ATC clearance unless otherwise directed by ATC.

NOTE: There can be a case where the threat aircraft track or altitude information is lost during an RA. In this case, the RA will terminate without a “CLEAR OF CONFLICT” annunciation.

b. TCAS II OPERATION.

(1) Pilot Initiated TCAS II Self-Test:

(a) The TCAS II should be tested using the pilot initiated self-test feature during cockpit preparation. A successful test is indicated by (provide test results from particular TCAS II system)

(b) Use of the self-test function in flight will inhibit TCAS II operation for up to 20 seconds depending upon the number of aircraft being tracked.

(c) The ATC transponder will not function during some portion of the self-test sequence.

(d) All aircraft systems providing information to TCAS II must be operating in their normal mode during the Self-Test.

(2) Ground Operation:

(a) The TCAS II should not be selected out of STBY to TA/RA until just prior to takeoff.

(b) The TCAS II should be selected to STBY immediately after clearing runway following landing.

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED**(3) TA Mode:**

(a) The TA position should only be used to preclude unnecessary RA's when intentionally operating near other aircraft such as to closely spaced parallel runways (less than 1200 feet apart).

(b) In TA mode, RA's will not be issued.

(4) WX-ONLY Mode: When WX-ONLY mode is selected, traffic information, traffic advisories, and resolution advisories are inhibited on the weather radar scope. Therefore, this mode should be used only in the event TCAS interferes with weather information. (This example is to show the kind of procedure to be developed. Procedures will vary depending upon installation; such as pop-up display modes, PFD/ND implementation, etc.)

c. TCAS II System Characteristics.

(1) "CLIMB" RA's are inhibited with flaps greater than XX degrees.

(2) When below 1000 feet AGL, the TCAS II will automatically switch into the TA only mode.

(3) "INCREASE CLIMB" RA's are inhibited with flaps greater than XX degrees.

(4) "DESCEND" RA's are inhibited below 1200 feet AGL while climbing and below 1000 feet AGL while descending.

(5) "INCREASE DESCENT" RA's are inhibited below 1450 feet AGL.

(6) All RA and TA voice messages are inhibited below 600 feet AGL while climbing and below 400 feet AGL while descending.

(7) The TCAS II surveillance may not function at distances less than 900 feet.

(8) During windshear and/or GPWS/TAWS warnings, TCAS II switches automatically into a TA only mode with aural annunciation inhibited. In this mode, RA's are not issued and current RA's become TA's. The TCAS II remains in TA Only mode for 10 seconds after the windshear or GPWS/TAWS warning is removed. TCAS II aural annunciations are enabled immediately following the removal of the windshear or GPWS/TAWS warning aural annunciation.

d. TCAS II Abnormal Procedures.

(1) RA OFF Flag in IVSI.

APPENDIX 1. AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL SUPPLEMENT CONTINUED

(a) Verify TCAS/transponder function selector is in TA/RA position.

(b) If TA/RA is selected and “RA OFF” flag is in view, then the pilot with the operable IVSI (flag not in view) should be the pilot flying.

(2) AMBER FLAG in IVSI.

(a) Check XPDR FAIL light.

(b) If OFF select other altitude source.

(c) If ON select alternate ATCRBS transponder. (TCAS II will no longer be available.)

(3) XPDR FAIL Light Illuminated. Select alternate ATCRBS transponder. (TCAS II will no longer be available.)

e. These examples are to show the kinds of abnormal procedures to be developed. Procedures will vary depending upon the installation; such as dual Mode S, etc.

8. SECTION IV – PERFORMANCE. No change from basic airplane flight manual.

APPENDIX 2. TRANSPONDER TESTS

Using a suitable calibrated transponder test set, conduct the following tests:

NOTE: CAUTION When conducting any ground testing of the transponder or TCAS system, it is most important that proper procedures are followed to prevent being a source of interference to ATC or to other TCAS aircraft operating in the area. Ground maintenance checks or ramp testing (e.g., altimetry or bearing accuracy testing) can cause data to be transmitted which produce false targets for the ground ATC surveillance systems or airborne TCAS aircraft. These false indications of “intruder aircraft” could result in unnecessary ATC communications and possibly in TCAS induced aircraft maneuvers. Therefore, such testing should be conducted in coordination with ATC and use antenna shielding (i.e., transmission absorption covers or caps) to prevent test data that could generate false intruder information from being transmitted. Use of high-powered, hangar-mounted transponders to conduct ramp testing is NOT an acceptable means for conducting either TCAS or transponder ramp testing.

TEST DESCRIPTION

1. Mode Test. Identifies modes of operation. Interrogations are made in Modes A, C, and S (uplink format 11) to determine which modes the transponder replies to. These are the modes tested during the Auto Test sequence.
2. Reply Delay. Interrogates with valid modes and verifies Reply delay minus Range delay (average of best 8 out of 13 replies) equals:
 - a. 128.00 us (± 0.25 us) for Mode S.
 - b. 3.00 us (± 0.50 us) for ATCRBS.
3. Reply Jitter. Interrogates with valid modes and verifies, using best 8 out of 13 replies. Reply Jitter (changes In Reply Delay) is less than or equal to:
 - a. 0.05 us for Mode S
 - b. 0.06 us for Intermode (All-Call)
 - c. 0.10 us for ATCRBS.
4. ATCRBS Reply. Interrogates with ATCRBS (Modes A and C) interrogations and verifies:
 - a. F1 to F2 spacing is 20.3 us (± 0.10 us)

APPENDIX 2. TRANSPONDER TESTS CONTINUED

b. F1 and F2 pulse width between the 0.5 amplitude point on the leading and trailing edge is 0.45 us (± 0.10 us).

5. SLS Level. Interrogates with valid ATCRBS Interrogations including P2 pulse. Interrogations are conducted with P2 level at -9 dB and then again at 0 dB. Test verifies:

- a. Transponder does not reply when P2 level is at 0 dB (UUT is suppressed).
- b. Transponder replies when P2 level is at -9 dB (UUT is not suppressed).

6. ATCRBS Only All-Call. Interrogates with an ATCRBS only All-Call and verifies:

- a. If Mode S is valid, no reply is received from a Mode S transponder.
- b. If no Mode S, reply is received from an ATCRBS transponder.

7. Mode S All-Call. Interrogates with the ATCRBS (mode A) Mode S All-Call. Address received in downlink format (DF) 11 is then used in an uplink format (UF) 4 interrogation to solicit a DF4 reply. The address received is decoded and compared with the address sent.

8. Invalid Mode S Address. Interrogates with Mode S interrogations using two addresses different from the address determined by the Mode S All-Call, UF11. Test verifies no reply is received. Addresses used are one greater and 256 greater than the correct address.

9. SPR On/Off. Interrogates with a Mode S interrogation with the Synchronous Phase Reversal (SPR) on, verifying correct reply is received. Then same interrogation is sent again with the SPR off, verifying no reply is received.

10. Mode S UF0. Interrogates with Mode S uplink format 0 (Short air-to-air surveillance, ACAS) verifying reply is received that has correct altitude (compared with Mode C altitude), address (compared with Mode Test address) and format.

11. Mode S UF4. Interrogates with Mode S uplink format 4 (Surveillance, altitude request), verifying reply is received that has correct altitude (compared with Mode C altitude), address (compared with Mode Test address) and format.

12. Mode S UF5. Interrogates with Mode S uplink format 5 (Surveillance, identity request) verifying reply is received that has correct identity (compared with Mode A identity), address (compared with Mode Test address) and format.

13. Mode S UF11. Interrogates with Mode S uplink format 11, verifying reply is received that has correct address (compared with Mode Test address) and format.

APPENDIX 2. TRANSPONDER TESTS CONTINUED

14. Mode S UF16. Interrogates with Mode S uplink format 16 (Long air-to-air surveillance, ACAS), verifying reply, if received, has correct altitude (compared with the Mode C altitude), address (compared with Mode Test address) and format. No reply to UF16 does not fail Mode S in Auto Test.
15. Mode S UF20. Interrogates with Mode S uplink format 20 (Comm A, altitude request) verifying reply received has correct altitude (compared with Mode C altitude), address (compared with Mode Test address) and format. No reply to UF21 does not fail Mode S in Auto Test.
16. Mode S UF21. Interrogates with Mode S uplink format 21 (Comm A, identity request) verifying reply received has correct identity (compared with Mode A identity), address (compared with Mode Test address) and format. No reply to UF21 does not fail Mode S in Auto Test.
17. Squitter. Verifies squitters are being received from the UUT every 0.8 to 2.4 seconds.
18. Frequency. Verifies frequency of transponder is 1090 MHz (\pm MHz). Frequency is displayed in the Auto Test screen.
19. Diversity. Verifies diversity isolation (power level difference between UUT “On” antenna squitters and “Off” antenna squitters) is greater than or equal to 20 dB. Diversity isolation is displayed in Auto Test screen.

NOTE: To insure ≥ 20 dB dynamic range, test must be run within 50 feet (15.24 meters) of UUT antenna being tested.

20. MTL Difference. Verifies Receiver Sensitivity (MTL) to Mode A interrogations equals MTL to Mode C interrogations (± 1.0 dB).
21. Altitude Reporting. Verifies the reported altitude in the AC field of DF0, DF4, D16, and D20 corresponds to the value provided from the on board altitude source to the transponder and is reported with the quantization indicated by the Q bit in the AC field. For aircraft with 25 foot or better pressure altitude sources, pressure altitude information should be reported in 25-foot increments. Pressure altitude data obtained from a source with larger than 25-foot resolution shall not be reported using 25-foot increments.

NOTE: To ensure the altitude is being reported correctly and with the proper quantization, the aircraft altitude will need to be incremented over a 300 foot range in 25 foot increments.